A few words bandied about in Shipping with abundance are 'Command' and 'Discipline'. This so, specifically from a mindset that is not just reluctant to change, but can be punitively hostile to even rational suggestions desiring or questioning the same. Indeed with such a reaction, it becomes all the more imperative to delve into present practices in Shipping, onboard specifically but onshore as well to some extent.
In almost all Charters of Shipping Companies, the common thread in ISM or Management Manuals, also prominently posted as mandated by Authorities on the priority of Company Management onshore as:
Safety of Life at Sea
Prevention of Environmental Pollution
Safety of the Ship
However Command structures on board have become so deeply ingrained, unchangeable, unquestionable that sometimes even under ludicrous situations that compromise all three stated objectives and intended positions of Shore Management. Specific examples on this fall in the scope of this article and will be delved into. These structures are also specific to people trained mostly in non technical aspects of the Ship and excludes completely without rationale, those who have intricate and detailed knowledge of the ships' technical aspects and much more.
Moreover the training imparted to those aspiring to move up the 'Chain of Command' is to primarily preserve integrity of Command above any other consideration on board. While superficially this may seem reasonable at first, scratching a bit deeper exposes inherent flaws that adversely impinge on all Company management sworn mandates in the Management System. The reason one hears mostly for upholding ' Integrity of Command' is as mentioned earlier, given as 'Discipline' and 'Safety'. The more correct reason however could lie in protecting a historical power structure, harshly dented by the entry of Engineers in the last 100 years or so.
The best examples of Command and highly 'disciplined' societies however inconveniently fall in Nazi Germany, Fascist Japan during the wars, North Korea, Saddam's Iraq, Libya's Gadaffi or the former Soviet Union. Closer home they also inconveniently lie in Titanic Captain slamming doors on dozens of Engineers within machinery spaces, insurance companies making massive profits while unsafe ships went down with crews, or reported cases of unscrupulous Managements and owners scuttling ships along with crews in collusion with Insurance companies.
This highly 'disciplined Command' structure on board had to be dragged, screaming and hollering to try and make them comply with a very basic accountable management system on board, that would give some respect to Safety of Life at sea and environmental protection. That too happened after massive losses to insurance companies and Banks in the wake of damages doled out by US Courts after the Exxon Valdez incident forced them to exert pressure and seek changes in Management and Compliance.
Thus just as open, responsive to change and adaptive Governance charters would impinge the leaderships of highly 'command and discipline' based Nation States, so too was the conclusion onboard and amongst several management companies upon the imposition of the ISM Code or Safety Management System. However the 'Command and Discipline' lobbies have then and subsequently managed to maintain clauses within the Management System that stall a distinctive break towards a open management system completely wedded to the Charter of Safety and Environmental protection.
These clauses also run counter to the stated charter on many occasions if not directly, then certainly in it's inherent closed door, secretive and unquestionable approach to 'Command' on board. This in effect shows a great reluctance and resistance to evolve to a more effective Management system on board.
However, the question arises would a Modern Management substitute translate to 'indiscipline' on board? Fact is exactly for the same reasons it does not constitute ''indiscipline' in numerous bodies ashore, including ones where safety is of paramount concern, it would obviously not subvert 'discipline' on board too. Also does it mean there's a chaotic democracy in decision making on board? Again this doesn't arise as a modern management system would seek and lead to a more responsible, responsive and adaptive structure. The inherent transparency would would demand for greater study and understanding amongst those who implement it, much unlike the 'Made for Command' structure on board today. The structures would better represent experience, understanding, technical compulsions, safety and environmental aspects in a more holistic manner than at present.
Examples of required changes could reflect for example in the loading process. Unchangeable structures since yore have been rigidly maintained despite the demand for a better technical understanding of the process. The end result is a person sitting on a console calculating stress and strain without having done a single course on Strength of Materials, Applied Mechanics. Even the qualification for Command is a simple basic Naval Architecture course structure designed for the run up to the MOT examinations. Engineers with a significantly higher and more detailed background of Strength of Materials, Applied Mechanics and Naval architecture are not allowed to be a part of the process. The reason again is not hard to see, 'Command' lobbies retaining a 'commercial' hold on the process of shipping goods. Common sense and an adaptive sensible approach must certainly aim to put people with better equipped skills in charge of such processes.
Understanding the technical and seamanship element on board ships today is another example. Compared to a 100 years ago, the complexity of the technical element on board ships has increased tremendously. The seamanship element compared to the technical element has decreased too significantly in percent terms. Understanding the Technical and Engineering perspective is more essential today than is understanding or not understanding how different knots are made in surviving a crossing of the North Pacific or North Atlantic. Infact the equipment on Bridge as a whole is not much more smarter than knowing the 'ropes' on a single Smart Phone of today. Not the least in the skill level required of usage. A smart 16 year old left to himself on the Bridge of a moving ship Mid Pacific, would probably acquaint himself with the Radar, Course plotting and communication equipment in not more than a few hours at the maximum. A University Graduate topper left to himself in the Engine room of the same would probably remain muddled even a month later.
The differences are obvious and apparent. However the System fails to react to the need to address core charter issues in the best possible manner. Reviews are referred to as Command Reviews. Only the Command is mandated to review the Management System on board and suggest improvements. It may not be a bad idea to set a thief to catch another, but it is a bit far fetched asking a Saddam Hussien or Gadaffi to suggest reviews on running their countries better. Today the Command is mandated to 'ensure' the IOPP logs are filled properly, while the command has never operated any IOPP equipment and knows next to nothing on the equipment and processes involved. There are no solutions to these sort of issues for which there are dozens of examples in the Command based approach on board. As a consequence Interdepartmental issues arise naturally all the time all over these years as a result of these inherent flaws and contradictions within the setup on board.
Engineers can find the atmosphere on board stifling at times. Drop outs are endemic and some batches of well trained Chief Engineers reflect a working life of just 20-30 months onboard. Near miss reporting is a significant farce on board and borders a major fraud. To impress certain authorities, companies pander by increasing drill frequency with little thought as to whether even the processes are of any significance. Thus life boat drills over the last 20 years caused more death and serious injury than the lives they have saved. Life boat designs remain rigid and rooted in the last century.
With such systems change can occur only by default and they do. However they do not remove the anachronism present, they only serve to highlight it more. So today the Command on board does not know how the Ship moves, what range the Main Engines operate in and their limitations, how Power is generated, how Fresh water is made, how Food is preserved, how Cargo is shifted, how Hatches open or close, how Emergency Systems on board work, what back up systems are present, how Accommodation conditioning is maintained, how Ships are steered, how IOPP and IAPP systems work and so on, and when you compare it with Command a couple of Centuries ago one realizes would have known every plank, rope, sail, lantern on board, the contrast just keeps increasing and constituting a perilous state in reality.
Obviously the only solution is more 'Command' in the Command System. So if Cargo work is affected by stoppage of Gear, Command reports and Engineers explain, if the steering breaks down Command reports, Engineers explain, if there's an oil spill Command reports and Engineers explain. There is little non technical on board to explain. That is why the shift to a more mature, adaptive to change system is very urgently required on board to attract better quality personnel, decrease burn out, increase technological, economic and social benefits on board.
The 'Command' System must be given the burial at sea it truly deserves.
In almost all Charters of Shipping Companies, the common thread in ISM or Management Manuals, also prominently posted as mandated by Authorities on the priority of Company Management onshore as:
Safety of Life at Sea
Prevention of Environmental Pollution
Safety of the Ship
However Command structures on board have become so deeply ingrained, unchangeable, unquestionable that sometimes even under ludicrous situations that compromise all three stated objectives and intended positions of Shore Management. Specific examples on this fall in the scope of this article and will be delved into. These structures are also specific to people trained mostly in non technical aspects of the Ship and excludes completely without rationale, those who have intricate and detailed knowledge of the ships' technical aspects and much more.
Moreover the training imparted to those aspiring to move up the 'Chain of Command' is to primarily preserve integrity of Command above any other consideration on board. While superficially this may seem reasonable at first, scratching a bit deeper exposes inherent flaws that adversely impinge on all Company management sworn mandates in the Management System. The reason one hears mostly for upholding ' Integrity of Command' is as mentioned earlier, given as 'Discipline' and 'Safety'. The more correct reason however could lie in protecting a historical power structure, harshly dented by the entry of Engineers in the last 100 years or so.
The best examples of Command and highly 'disciplined' societies however inconveniently fall in Nazi Germany, Fascist Japan during the wars, North Korea, Saddam's Iraq, Libya's Gadaffi or the former Soviet Union. Closer home they also inconveniently lie in Titanic Captain slamming doors on dozens of Engineers within machinery spaces, insurance companies making massive profits while unsafe ships went down with crews, or reported cases of unscrupulous Managements and owners scuttling ships along with crews in collusion with Insurance companies.
This highly 'disciplined Command' structure on board had to be dragged, screaming and hollering to try and make them comply with a very basic accountable management system on board, that would give some respect to Safety of Life at sea and environmental protection. That too happened after massive losses to insurance companies and Banks in the wake of damages doled out by US Courts after the Exxon Valdez incident forced them to exert pressure and seek changes in Management and Compliance.
Thus just as open, responsive to change and adaptive Governance charters would impinge the leaderships of highly 'command and discipline' based Nation States, so too was the conclusion onboard and amongst several management companies upon the imposition of the ISM Code or Safety Management System. However the 'Command and Discipline' lobbies have then and subsequently managed to maintain clauses within the Management System that stall a distinctive break towards a open management system completely wedded to the Charter of Safety and Environmental protection.
These clauses also run counter to the stated charter on many occasions if not directly, then certainly in it's inherent closed door, secretive and unquestionable approach to 'Command' on board. This in effect shows a great reluctance and resistance to evolve to a more effective Management system on board.
However, the question arises would a Modern Management substitute translate to 'indiscipline' on board? Fact is exactly for the same reasons it does not constitute ''indiscipline' in numerous bodies ashore, including ones where safety is of paramount concern, it would obviously not subvert 'discipline' on board too. Also does it mean there's a chaotic democracy in decision making on board? Again this doesn't arise as a modern management system would seek and lead to a more responsible, responsive and adaptive structure. The inherent transparency would would demand for greater study and understanding amongst those who implement it, much unlike the 'Made for Command' structure on board today. The structures would better represent experience, understanding, technical compulsions, safety and environmental aspects in a more holistic manner than at present.
Examples of required changes could reflect for example in the loading process. Unchangeable structures since yore have been rigidly maintained despite the demand for a better technical understanding of the process. The end result is a person sitting on a console calculating stress and strain without having done a single course on Strength of Materials, Applied Mechanics. Even the qualification for Command is a simple basic Naval Architecture course structure designed for the run up to the MOT examinations. Engineers with a significantly higher and more detailed background of Strength of Materials, Applied Mechanics and Naval architecture are not allowed to be a part of the process. The reason again is not hard to see, 'Command' lobbies retaining a 'commercial' hold on the process of shipping goods. Common sense and an adaptive sensible approach must certainly aim to put people with better equipped skills in charge of such processes.
Understanding the technical and seamanship element on board ships today is another example. Compared to a 100 years ago, the complexity of the technical element on board ships has increased tremendously. The seamanship element compared to the technical element has decreased too significantly in percent terms. Understanding the Technical and Engineering perspective is more essential today than is understanding or not understanding how different knots are made in surviving a crossing of the North Pacific or North Atlantic. Infact the equipment on Bridge as a whole is not much more smarter than knowing the 'ropes' on a single Smart Phone of today. Not the least in the skill level required of usage. A smart 16 year old left to himself on the Bridge of a moving ship Mid Pacific, would probably acquaint himself with the Radar, Course plotting and communication equipment in not more than a few hours at the maximum. A University Graduate topper left to himself in the Engine room of the same would probably remain muddled even a month later.
The differences are obvious and apparent. However the System fails to react to the need to address core charter issues in the best possible manner. Reviews are referred to as Command Reviews. Only the Command is mandated to review the Management System on board and suggest improvements. It may not be a bad idea to set a thief to catch another, but it is a bit far fetched asking a Saddam Hussien or Gadaffi to suggest reviews on running their countries better. Today the Command is mandated to 'ensure' the IOPP logs are filled properly, while the command has never operated any IOPP equipment and knows next to nothing on the equipment and processes involved. There are no solutions to these sort of issues for which there are dozens of examples in the Command based approach on board. As a consequence Interdepartmental issues arise naturally all the time all over these years as a result of these inherent flaws and contradictions within the setup on board.
Engineers can find the atmosphere on board stifling at times. Drop outs are endemic and some batches of well trained Chief Engineers reflect a working life of just 20-30 months onboard. Near miss reporting is a significant farce on board and borders a major fraud. To impress certain authorities, companies pander by increasing drill frequency with little thought as to whether even the processes are of any significance. Thus life boat drills over the last 20 years caused more death and serious injury than the lives they have saved. Life boat designs remain rigid and rooted in the last century.
With such systems change can occur only by default and they do. However they do not remove the anachronism present, they only serve to highlight it more. So today the Command on board does not know how the Ship moves, what range the Main Engines operate in and their limitations, how Power is generated, how Fresh water is made, how Food is preserved, how Cargo is shifted, how Hatches open or close, how Emergency Systems on board work, what back up systems are present, how Accommodation conditioning is maintained, how Ships are steered, how IOPP and IAPP systems work and so on, and when you compare it with Command a couple of Centuries ago one realizes would have known every plank, rope, sail, lantern on board, the contrast just keeps increasing and constituting a perilous state in reality.
Obviously the only solution is more 'Command' in the Command System. So if Cargo work is affected by stoppage of Gear, Command reports and Engineers explain, if the steering breaks down Command reports, Engineers explain, if there's an oil spill Command reports and Engineers explain. There is little non technical on board to explain. That is why the shift to a more mature, adaptive to change system is very urgently required on board to attract better quality personnel, decrease burn out, increase technological, economic and social benefits on board.
The 'Command' System must be given the burial at sea it truly deserves.
Makes sense to have a better management system on board.
ReplyDeleteEye opener article.
ReplyDelete