Simple Solutions for Safer Ships

In the previous posts I discussed a few major issues that conflict with defined management aims on board. 

1.       Imposition of a Command system without recourse to corrective action and review.

2.       Command imposition by a Master with little knowledge of key Shipboard systems.  

3.       Fundamental Conflict between Command based and Modern Management Systems.

In view of the imposition of the above the working environ on board remains vitiated. It results in the following:

1.       Conflict with Management Aims of the Company and Command on board.

2.       Inter Departmental conflict.

3.       Restricted flow of information/ communication.

4.       Command based reviews only on the Management System on board.

5.       Command powers given in a highly technical setup to a Non-technical person.

6.       Prevention of alternate and better versions of on board management coming up.

It has also been demonstrated that Command based economies, Nations and company set ups ashore have failed miserably in the past century and beyond. Specifically so on the human rights front and importantly on the economic fronts also. While lip synching on Discipline and Safety these systems do nothing more than covering up lapses and worsening safety while preventing a next generation of Management reforms on board that would lead to ultimately major financial savings for the Company. This will be explained herewith.

If we are to correctly assess responsibility parameters on Modern ships they would be:

1.       Technical Aspects

2.       Navigation, Mooring and Anchoring Operations

3.       Port Cargo Operations

4.       Admin and housekeeping duties.

Most ship safety related failures and accidents occur in 1 and 2 of the above. Technical failures are largely because of acute shortage of key personnel.  Navigational ones are due to the fact that those responsible are also focused on 3 and 4. A Large number of accidents related to Navigational operations are related to Fatigue, these are primarily due to those responsible for them working on Port cargo operations as also Admin and housekeeping duties. These are well known and no amount of circulars or admonishments would turn the statistical tide against. 

Needless to repeat Navigational errors, collisions cause immense financial losses to the Industry each year. Yet the easiest way out looking at the 4 points above is disassociating largely the Cargo and Admin/ Housekeeping operations and responsibilities from those who Navigate and man look out watches.

A logical or practical solution to the above would be to introduce a Deck Engineer and Admin Officer on board in the near future:

The Deck Engineer:

The Deck Engineer proposed should be the rank of a 2^nd Engineer. Capable of dealing with all essential Deck Machinery, Cargo handling operations, Ballast exchange and Stability and strength calculations. His responsibilities on board would not include Navigation or Machinery Space operations, but he could in an emergency situation mid ocean be helpful in terms of technical experience and knowledge. Just as Engineers working machinery spaces work on Deck machineries. Being an Engineer he would have a far better and productive working relationship with the Engineering department on board. 

While the Deck Engineer is responsible for the loading operation, he should be entrusted of satisfying the Navigational Mate that the loading (stresses and stability), drafts are to the satisfaction of the Navigational Department for safe passage. 

This results in the following: 

1.       Close coordination of the loading process is maintained between the Navigational and Engineering Departments.

2.       The commercial related pressure is de-linked from the Navigational Master and Mate.

3.       Navigational Master and Mates get the required hours of rest prior to departure Ports.

4.       Whilst this does not absolve the Navigating Master and Mate from responsibilities of satisfying themselves with regards to safe stresses and stability, it does provide them with focus on their primary task that being of safe Navigation.

The Admin Officer:

The Admin Officer proposed here is a Hotel Management Graduate familiar with documentation and administrative procedures, provision management, accounting, housekeeping duties. At a later more developed stage the post could be entrusted dealing with certificates, documents, immigration and other authorities. However at present freeing up the Mate and Master from active cargo and Deck responsibilities frees up time to retain document handling. 

Post conclusion:

These simple changes in the future would lead to safer navigation, less fatigue, harmonious interdepartmental relationship and thus a more cohesive work environment. All these would have a far more positive impact on Safe working on board a Merchant vessel than any proposed legislation's and campaigns.

My next post will be detailing how these changes affect safety, relationships, human rights records and foster better Management and financial savings for companies.

Master: A Non Conformity on Board

In the first blog i mentioned briefly the morbid fascination in the Shipping Industry with 'Discipline and Command'. It was mentioned in context with examples of Nation States and organizations that make these as primary motivators to work ethic or an elusively satiated society. Truth is just as those examples depict, it never happens or has ever happened as was evident in Nazi Germany, Fascist Japan, Maoist China or North Korea. Centralized Command Systems have been a failure throughout. 

 It's only the Authoritarian without any real ideas, that banks on 'Discipline and Command' as the primary motivator to do the 'idealistic' work intended. However that requires a massive trampling and crushing of basic Human rights and Individual principles, despite the known fact that the ideal system remains elusive. Such organizations in the commercial environment of better managed Companies have been largely obliterated as a result both of enhanced awareness of rights and also better and higher commercial and ethical objectives pursued.

So is 'Discipline ' a wrong yardstick to go by? Indeed it is if used as a primary. I have met people from Kolkata (formerly Calcutta) who swore the Calcutta Metro would go to dogs considering the 'indiscipline' and chaos on the Streets above. That the Metro would never succeed because people were 'undisciplined'.  But did it happen? The same sentiment was expressed when the Delhi Metro came up in a city known for it's traffic 'unruliness'. What were the results when a well thought out System was laid out for so called 'undisciplined' clients? 3 times in a decade the Calcutta Metro was declared amongst the Worlds best services. The Delhi Metro continues to provide excellent to the 'second' services with great facilities. No fuss and no imposition, just a good system in itself leads to orderly behavior.

Shipping failed in all it's 'disciplinary' endeavors. It's top Managers, Masters, owners willfully subverted and exploited to their commercial advantage  all what could be possible in the name of 'Discipline', including scuttling ships, not providing crew and family legitimate redressal to injuries and death, causing over decades incalculable harm to the environment through pollution and more. Come Exxon Valdez and a wiping out of a few Insurance firms and Banking companies and as a result pressure on authorities to 'control' the Industry led to 'implementation' of stricter norms and auditing procedures. The suggested revamp on Management was accompanied by howls of protest. By whom? Ship owners, Management and Masters community. Every trick in the trade was and has been used to try and subvert the changes till it was no longer possible to do so. But one 'trick' succeeded and went through. It subverts the entire chain in the Shipping Industry till date. The 'Chain of Command' on Board.

When the force to instill a Safety Management System on Board became unbearable, it was accepted with a condition that is transparent in all Management Manuals: That the Command can and may at it's pleasure supersede the Code, in the name of Discipline and Safety of course. In the enthusiasm to  overplay this point, the Management Manuals of all Companies are accompanied by the dictum that 'Come what may, we shall always protect and assist the Master. Good sentiments really, but what is the net reality of this? Who has been given these over riding powers? What checks and balances are given to avoid misuse of those powers? These pertinent questions though not asked often, will be answered herewith:

Firstly the notion that  Command runs Ships: Ironically the Command system fails every day in that endeavor. The Master does not possess the Knowledge, the capability to command work in the technical field.

Ship Systems: Masters are not trained in ship systems knowledge that is largely technical now and thus barely superficially knowledgeable about Ship Systems including safety and back up systems

Primarily as the Cadet and Officer subsequently moves up the 'Chain of Command', he is taught primarily to preserve this integrity above all. This training rubs of negatively on all interactions on board. This leads to ridiculous situations where the Cadets have access to Ship communication and mail addressed to Master/ Chief Engineers, but is not accessible to a Chief Engineer. The conflict in the interaction of a Management system and the 'Command System' or 'Chain of Command' comes into the picture at every possible interaction. While Chief Engineers may be Chief Fire coordinators because of their knowledge on the safety systems, there have been cases of Masters ordering CO2 release in Engine Rooms without operation of Quick closing valves or other shut down devices/ sprinkler systems. That most Masters retain all Master keys with themselves or the Mate/ Steward rather than share one with a Chief Engineer, puts clearly the pressure of the conflict on the Chief Engineer.

It reflects rather poorly on Management Companies who have failed to analyze and understand the root cause of problems and conflicting circumstances and situations on board. The conflict with their desire to have a proper management system versus the desire of the Master community to overplay the centralized Command dogma.

In view of the fact that Masters neither understand, appreciate the complexity of on board systems and their interactions, and act on mostly on the basis of a failed dogma in a way that accountability is hard to maintain. There are no checks or balances on how a Master delivers with reference to improving Management on board. Most have no clue on Process Management Systems as are most Shipping Company Managements. Thus simple things take a long time for a company to evolve a basic process solution.  A documented process with checks. It has not been yet achieved with respect to many items as yet in most companies.

The created conflict between maintaining 'integrity of command' over proper implementation of a management systems with proper checks and balances is artificial, with the Master being the personification of that conflict. This has in the past and continues to jeopardize safety of personnel, environment and more on board as a consequence. That makes the Master a non conformity on board.

Command, Discipline and Modern Management

A few words bandied about in Shipping with abundance are 'Command' and 'Discipline'. This so, specifically from a mindset that is not just reluctant to change, but can be punitively hostile to even rational suggestions desiring or questioning the same. Indeed with such a reaction, it becomes all the more imperative to delve into present practices in Shipping, onboard specifically but onshore as well to some extent.

In almost all Charters of Shipping Companies, the common thread in ISM or Management Manuals, also prominently posted as mandated by Authorities on the priority of Company Management onshore as:

Safety of Life at Sea
Prevention of Environmental Pollution
Safety of the Ship

However Command structures on board have become so deeply ingrained, unchangeable, unquestionable that sometimes even under ludicrous situations that compromise all three stated objectives and intended positions of Shore Management. Specific examples on this fall in the scope of this article and will be delved into. These structures are also specific to people trained mostly in non technical aspects of the Ship and excludes completely without rationale, those who have intricate and detailed knowledge of the ships' technical aspects and much more.

Moreover the training imparted to those aspiring to move up the 'Chain of Command' is to primarily preserve integrity of Command above any other consideration on board. While superficially this may seem reasonable at first, scratching a bit deeper exposes inherent flaws that adversely impinge on all Company management sworn mandates in the Management System. The reason one hears mostly for upholding ' Integrity of Command' is as mentioned earlier, given as 'Discipline' and 'Safety'. The more correct reason however could lie in protecting a historical power structure, harshly dented by the entry of Engineers in the last 100 years or so.

The best examples of Command and highly 'disciplined' societies however inconveniently fall in Nazi Germany, Fascist Japan during the wars, North Korea, Saddam's Iraq, Libya's Gadaffi or the former Soviet Union. Closer home they also inconveniently lie in Titanic Captain slamming doors on dozens of Engineers within machinery spaces, insurance companies making massive profits while unsafe ships went down with crews, or reported cases of unscrupulous Managements and owners scuttling ships along with crews in collusion with Insurance companies.

This highly 'disciplined Command' structure on board had to be dragged, screaming and hollering to try and make them comply with a very basic accountable management system on board, that would give some respect to Safety of Life at sea and environmental protection. That too happened after massive losses to insurance companies and Banks in the wake of damages doled out by US Courts after the Exxon Valdez incident forced them to exert pressure and seek changes in Management and Compliance.

Thus just as open, responsive to change and adaptive Governance charters would impinge the leaderships of highly 'command and discipline' based Nation States, so too was the conclusion onboard and amongst several management companies upon the imposition of the ISM Code or Safety Management System. However the 'Command and Discipline' lobbies have then and subsequently managed to maintain clauses within the Management System that stall a distinctive break towards a open management system completely wedded to the Charter of Safety and Environmental protection.

These clauses also run counter to the stated charter on many occasions if not directly, then certainly in it's inherent closed door, secretive and unquestionable approach to 'Command' on board. This in effect shows a great reluctance and resistance to evolve to a more effective Management system on board.

However, the question arises would a Modern Management substitute translate to 'indiscipline' on board? Fact is exactly for the same reasons it does not constitute ''indiscipline' in numerous bodies ashore, including ones where safety is of paramount concern, it would obviously not subvert 'discipline' on board too. Also does it mean there's a chaotic democracy in decision making on board? Again this doesn't arise as a modern management system would seek and lead to a more responsible, responsive and adaptive structure. The inherent transparency would would demand for greater study and understanding amongst those who implement it, much unlike the 'Made for Command' structure on board today. The structures would better represent experience, understanding, technical compulsions, safety and environmental aspects in a more holistic manner than at present.

Examples of required changes could reflect for example in the loading process. Unchangeable structures since yore have been rigidly maintained despite the demand for a better technical understanding of the process. The end result is a person sitting on a console calculating stress and strain without having done a single course on Strength of Materials, Applied Mechanics. Even the qualification for Command is a simple basic Naval Architecture course structure designed for the run up to the MOT examinations. Engineers with a significantly higher and more detailed background of Strength of Materials, Applied Mechanics and Naval architecture are not allowed to be a part of the process. The reason again is not hard to see, 'Command' lobbies retaining a 'commercial' hold on the process of shipping goods. Common sense and an adaptive sensible approach must certainly aim to put people with better equipped skills in charge of such processes.

Understanding the technical and seamanship element on board ships today is another example. Compared to a 100 years ago, the complexity of the technical element on board ships has increased tremendously. The seamanship element compared to the technical element has decreased too significantly in percent terms. Understanding the Technical and Engineering perspective is more essential today than is understanding or not understanding how different knots are made in surviving a crossing of the North Pacific or North Atlantic. Infact the equipment on Bridge as a whole is not much more smarter than knowing the 'ropes' on a single Smart Phone of today. Not the least in the skill level required of usage. A smart 16 year old left to himself on the Bridge of a moving ship Mid Pacific, would probably acquaint himself with the Radar, Course plotting and communication equipment in not more than a few hours at the maximum. A University Graduate topper left to himself in the Engine room of the same would probably remain muddled even a month later.

The differences are obvious and apparent. However the System fails to react to the need to address core charter issues in the best possible manner. Reviews are referred to as Command Reviews. Only the Command is mandated to review the Management System on board and suggest improvements. It may not be a bad idea to set a thief to catch another, but it is a bit far fetched asking a Saddam Hussien or Gadaffi to suggest reviews on running their countries better. Today the Command is mandated to 'ensure' the IOPP logs are filled properly, while the command has never operated any IOPP equipment and knows next to nothing on the equipment and processes involved. There are no solutions to these sort of issues for which there are dozens of examples in the Command based approach on board. As a consequence Interdepartmental issues arise naturally all the time all over these years as a result of these inherent flaws and contradictions within the setup on board.

Engineers can find the atmosphere on board stifling at times. Drop outs are endemic and some batches of well trained Chief Engineers reflect a working life of just 20-30 months onboard. Near miss reporting is a significant farce on board and borders a major fraud. To impress certain authorities, companies pander by increasing drill frequency with little thought as to whether  even the processes are of any significance. Thus life boat drills over the last 20 years caused more death and serious injury than the lives they have saved. Life boat designs remain rigid and rooted in the last century.

With such systems change can occur only by default and they do. However they do not remove the anachronism present, they only serve to highlight it more. So today the Command on board does not know how the Ship moves, what range the Main Engines operate in and their limitations, how Power is generated, how Fresh water is made, how Food is preserved, how Cargo is shifted, how Hatches open or close, how Emergency Systems on board work, what back up systems are present, how Accommodation conditioning is maintained, how Ships are steered, how IOPP and IAPP systems work and so on, and when you compare it with Command a couple of Centuries ago one realizes would have known every plank, rope, sail, lantern on board, the contrast just keeps increasing and constituting a perilous state in reality.

Obviously the only solution is more 'Command' in the Command System. So if Cargo work is affected by stoppage of Gear, Command reports and Engineers explain, if the steering breaks down Command reports, Engineers explain, if there's an oil spill Command reports and Engineers explain. There is little non technical on board to explain. That is why the shift to a more mature, adaptive to change system is very urgently required on board to attract better quality personnel, decrease burn out, increase technological, economic and social benefits on board.

The 'Command' System must be given the burial at sea it truly deserves.